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Copyright and Free Expression in 
China’s Film Industry 
By Eric Priest* 
 
This Article analyzes whether copyright, which creates private rights 
in original expression and is therefore a legal tool for restricting the dis-
semination of information, exacerbates or undercuts state censorship in 
China’s film industry. Recent scholarship suggests that copyright law 
reinforces China’s oppressive censorship regime because both copyright 
and state censorship erect legal barriers around expressive works. The 
theory that copyright enhances censorship in China, however, overlooks 
the immense tension between state attempts at information control and 
market-supported information production made possible by copyright. 
This Article demonstrates that the Chinese government does not wield 
unchecked, top-down control over China’s film industry because censor-
ship policy and practice are profoundly influenced by complex interlock-
ing power relationships between the audience, producers, and censoring 
authorities. These relationships result in a constant dialog between these 
groups that leads to concessions on all sides. Market-backed private pro-
ducers meaningfully influence censorship policy because they are key 
players in this power dynamic with sufficient leverage to counter the cen-
sors’ formidable heft. Drawing from political science literature on Chi-
nese economic reform, this Article provides a theoretical basis for arguing 
that selective enforcement of censorship rules, combined with (or indeed 
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driven by) market forces and economic realities, can lead to meaningful 
(albeit not absolute) liberalization and reform of the formal rules. The 
transformative power of copyright and commercialization is limited: it is 
not a panacea that will fully defang or obliterate censorship policies or 
trigger democratic reform. Nevertheless, market demands and filmmak-
ers’ need to satisfy those demands provide a counterbalance to state cen-
sorship that can, does, and will continue to erode censorship practices 
and increase expressive diversity in Chinese media. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does copyright amplify or undermine state censorship in Chi-
na’s film industry? The question has global salience today: as Chi-
na’s importance in the global film market increases—it is already 
the world’s second largest box office1—foreign producers seek 
more opportunities for preferential market access, resulting in for-
eign films and Chinese co-productions consciously targeting the 
Chinese market.2 Pervasive censorship and creative interference by 
authorities, however, means no producer, whether a powerful Hol-
lywood studio or a major domestic producer, enjoys complete crea-
tive control over a release in the Chinese market. Some observers 
rightly worry that in the film context, this will make China the tail 
that wags the global free-speech dog.3 The fear is that as produc-
ers—both Chinese and international—increasingly and consciously 
avoid sensitive subject matter that may offend Chinese censors, 
China’s domestic censorship regime will become the global de fac-
to censorship regime. 
An important nuance that this narrative misses, however, is 
that the influence works both ways. Films routinely violate numer-
ous censorship rules—including regulations that ban the depiction 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just Survive 
in China’s High-Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 484 (2014). 
2 See, e.g., Frederik Balfour & Ronald Grover, China and Hollywood Team Up for More 
Co-Productions, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
bw/magazine/china-and-hollywood-team-up-for-more-coproductions-09082011.html 
[http://perma.cc/R9HX-AEV5]. 
3 See, e.g., Cain Nunns, Hollywood Bows to China Soft Power, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/hollywood-bows-to-china-soft-power/ 
[http://perma.cc/83BT-6TFS]. 
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of graphic violence, sexuality, criminal activity, and even time tra-
vel—but still manage to pass censorship review and be eligible for 
wide theatrical release.4 Such films expose Chinese audiences to a 
much wider array of concepts, themes, characters, and visuals than 
the narrow, paternalistic socialist fare envisioned by state regula-
tions.5 Although the reasons behind the enforcement of censorship 
rules are complex and often opaque, the market for creative works, 
supported and enabled by copyright, is a significant factor in au-
thorities’ frequent decision to turn a blind eye to film producers’ 
use of officially verboten speech.6 
It might seem self-evident that market-driven content indus-
tries, underwritten and enabled by copyright, push the boundaries 
of officially permissible speech so long as audience tastes demand 
it. After all, if this were not the case, the Chinese government 
would continue to produce educational and propaganda films with 
little regard for audience preferences or market trends, as it did in 
the 1950s and 1960s.7 One glance at a list of China’s current sanc-
tioned theatrical offerings, however, will assure any skeptic that 
Chinese authorities care about audience tastes, about the marketa-
bility of works, and about the financial well-being of private domes-
tic film producers.8 While pirated and “underground” films have 
long been available, Chinese consumers now have access to “ab-
oveground” content representing more diverse subject matter, ge-
nres, and styles than ever before in China’s history.9 
Nevertheless, critics argue that copyright, as a legal tool for re-
stricting the dissemination of information, may reinforce rather 
than undermine censorship. Professor Peter Yu, for example, cau-
tions that strong copyright protection and free speech may 
represent “conflicting policy goals.”10 
                                                                                                                            
4 See infra Part III.B.2. 
5 See infra Part III.B.2. 
6 See infra Part III.B.2. 
7 See infra Part II.C. 
8 See infra Part II.C. 
9 See infra Part II.C. 
10 See Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China 
Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 431 (2008). 
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From the standpoint of information control, . . . 
stronger copyright protection may help control the 
flow of information. From restrictions on the distri-
bution of copyrighted materials developed by Chi-
nese authorities to the ban on domestic distribution 
of sensitive materials that have been developed and 
copyrighted by foreign authors, copyright protection 
is likely to help legitimize China’s information con-
trol policy.11 
Likewise, Stephen McIntyre argues that “[n]ot only does the 
substance of Chinese copyright law support China’s censorship 
system, but as [enforcement campaigns] illustrate[], copyright en-
forcement overlaps with and furthers the regime’s efforts to con-
trol the content and exchange of ideas.”12 Professor Jinying Li 
maintains that commercialized media and state censorship work in 
concert to marginalize alternative, outside-the-mainstream voices 
and viewpoints.13 Recent antipiracy campaigns, Li argues, are “part 
of China’s growing effort to suppress, regulate, or at least normal-
ize the otherwise uncontrollable underground domain . . . . More 
importantly, this push to suppress piracy coincided with an uptick 
in the Chinese government’s efforts to tighten its control over in-
formation circulation . . . .”14 Because many unapproved films are 
only available in China via piracy (since they cannot be legally dis-
tributed), Li argues that effective copyright enforcement would de-
prive underground Chinese filmmakers of key creative resources—
unapproved films—from which to draw for their own creations.15 
China’s deficient copyright enforcement, however, has enabled a 
generation of underground filmmakers, weaned on pirated content, 
to foster “a vibrant cineaste culture creating cinematic forms and 
practices that present an alternative to the hegemony of commer-
cial film industries and state censorship.”16 
                                                                                                                            
11 Id. at 429. 
12 Stephen McIntyre, The Yang Obeys, but the Yin Ignores: Copyright Law and Speech 
Suppression in the People’s Republic of China, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 75, 79 (2011). 
13 Jinying Li, From D-Buffs to the D-Generation: Piracy, Cinema, and an Alternative 
Public Sphere in Urban China, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 542, 543, 560 (2012). 
14 Id. at 542. 
15 Id. at 552–55. 
16 Id. at 543. 
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Professor Li’s critique raises an important question: under a 
strict state information control regime, is “approved” content in-
evitably complicit in censorship? Can approved content simulta-
neously be oppositional, or at least have the ability to erode power 
structures or bring fresh viewpoints on important, even sensitive 
topics? This Article argues, after examining the relationship be-
tween censors and commercial content producers in China’s film 
industry, that sanctioned commercial media can counter the power 
of the sanctioning authority and can do so even more effectively 
than unsanctioned “outsider” media. This is because Communist 
Party (the “Party”) censorship authorities—at least since the end 
of the Cultural Revolution in 1976—are not all-powerful in their 
ability to control content. In reality, censorship policy and practice 
are profoundly informed by complex interlocking power relation-
ships—in particular between the audience, producers, and censor-
ing authorities. These relationships result in a constant negotiation 
between the groups. This leads to concessions of varying degrees 
on all sides, with constant ebbs and flows as a result of changing 
political, social, and economic dynamics. To have a meaningful im-
pact on censorship policy, therefore, one must be a key player in 
this power relationship with enough leverage to counter the censor-
ing authorities’ formidable heft. 
This Article focuses its discussion of censorship and copyright 
in China’s film industry for two reasons. First, film is among the 
three types of long-form cultural works most heavily censored by 
Chinese authorities; the other two are books and television pro-
grams.17 Among these three industries, Chinese film has arguably 
had the deepest interaction with global commerce. It therefore 
provides a valuable case study for evaluating the effects of com-
mercialization and copyright on censorship practices in China. 
Second, Professor Hongsong Song is undertaking an analogous 
study of copyright, commercialization, and censorship in the book 
publishing industry.18 Professor Yu Zhao is doing valuable work on 
                                                                                                                            
17 Music is censored, but not as strictly as film, television, or books. See Priest, supra 
note 1, at 505. News media, of course, are heavily censored. See generally DANIELA 
STOCKMANN, MEDIA COMMERCIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHINA (2013). 
18 Hongsong Song, Dancing in Shackles: Copyright in China’s Highly Regulated 
Publishing Market, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 285, 296–308 (2013) [hereinafter Song, 
Dancing in Shackles]; Hongsong Song, Development of Copyright Law and the Transition of 
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censorship and commercialization in China’s television industry.19 
To date, however, no one has closely analyzed the effect of copy-
right and commercialization on China’s film censorship policy. 
To critique claims that copyright bolsters censorship in China, 
this Article focuses its analysis on the market’s role in shaping Chi-
na’s film industry and influencing censors. Admittedly, the market 
and copyright are not coextensive. For example, China had a rela-
tively thriving film market in the 1920s, before any copyright law 
existed there.20 Likewise, although China had a copyright law on 
the books by the 1930s,21 when it experienced its first “golden age” 
of film production,22 the law was rarely enforced and therefore un-
likely to have significantly contributed to the boom.23 Even today, 
film revenue in China is substantial but, due to lax copyright en-
forcement, it derives largely from box office receipts rather than 
sales of copies.24 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to view the mar-
ket’s effects on state information control policy in China today as a 
proxy for copyright’s effects, as the two are tightly intertwined. 
Copyright has long been recognized in the West as a robust market-
making mechanism for works of creative expression, supporting 
non-state centers of information production.25 The copyright re-
gime provides the property rights framework that orders China’s 
sophisticated modern film market and distinguishes it from the so-
cialist, state-funded film production system in place for four dec-
ades from the 1950s until the 1990s.26 Copyright provides the pre-
dictable allocation of rights necessary to secure the substantial pri-
vate investment—often transnational in nature—that drives pro-
                                                                                                                            
Press Control in China, 16 OR. REV. INT’L L. 249 (2014) [hereinafter Song, Development of 
Copyright Law]. 
19 Yu Zhao, Chinese Dream, Positive Energy, and TV Entertainment: The Tightrope 
Walking of Chinese Provincial Satellite TV Channels (April 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
20 See infra Part II.A. 
21 See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra Part II.B. 
23 See WILLIAM ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 52 (1995). 
24 Priest, supra note 1, at 481 & n.70. 
25 See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
289, 346–62 (1996). 
26 See infra Part II.E. 
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duction at the heart of China’s modern film market. Lastly, as Chi-
na’s film market evolves and matures, business models directly 
based on copyright licensing, such as on-demand Internet and set-
top box streaming, are an increasingly important revenue source 
for film producers.27 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly highlights the 
historical ties between copyright and censorship in Anglo-
American law and Chinese law. Part II describes the history of 
China’s film market, with a particular emphasis on the interplay 
between political and commercial trends and censorship. Part III 
considers whether market-induced liberalizations of China’s film 
censorship rules, discussed in Part II, have led to meaningful gains 
over time for expressive freedom in China’s film market. It analyz-
es “freedom” along two dimensions: (1) plurality of voices and 
viewpoints in films lawfully distributed in China, and (2) diversity 
of approved film subject matter. Changes along these dimensions 
can be observed through the extent to which market pressures lead 
to formal liberalization of the rules, or to which sanctioned films 
technically violate censorship rules. Part III proceeds by providing 
a brief outline of pertinent censorship rules. It then analyzes how 
market pressures have changed the rules or influenced how they 
are applied in practice. It argues that the general trend is toward 
greater, not less, freedom of expression in China’s film market, 
even if unbridled free expression is not in China’s foreseeable fu-
ture. It draws from political science literature on Chinese economic 
reform to provide a theoretical basis for arguing that selective en-
forcement of rules, combined with (or indeed driven by) market 
forces and economic realities, can lead to meaningful (albeit not 
absolute) liberalization and reform of formal rules. 
                                                                                                                            
27 See Priest, supra note 1, at 486–88 (noting that major Chinese online licensing 
platforms have purged their services of pirated content in recent years and paid copyright 
owners hundreds of millions of dollars for exclusive licenses to stream films and television 
content); see also Juro Osawa, Tencent to Distribute HBO Dramas, Movies Online in China, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tencent-partners-with-hbo-
to-distribute-tv-dramas-movies-online-in-china-1416902891 [http://perma.cc/M9UU-
TRSM] (discussing Chinese Internet giant Tencent’s exclusive online licensing deal with 
HBO, noting competitor Alibaba’s announced alliance with Lions Gate Entertainment to 
offer programs on set-top boxes in China, and noting that Xiaomi, China’s largest 
smartphone maker by shipments, announced plans to invest $1 billion in video content). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND CENSORSHIP IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
A. Copyright and Censorship in Anglo-American Law 
Copyright and press control have long been linked.28 As a gen-
eral matter, both copyright and state censorship erect legal barriers 
around certain works of expression, making it unlawful to publish 
them without proper privileges or permissions. Influential copy-
right historian L. Ray Patterson and others have argued that this is 
more than coincidence: the precursor to modern Anglo-American 
copyright was in fact born of the English monarchy’s early censor-
ship efforts.29 Patterson points to Queen Mary’s grant of a charter 
to the stationers’ guild in 1557 as the inception of copyright and a 
simultaneous attempt at press control.30 The charter gave Station-
ers’ Company members the exclusive right to print and publish in 
exchange, ostensibly, for the stationers’ compliance in suppressing 
seditious works.31 Patterson argues that the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution, when drafting the Copyright Clause,32 were aware of 
this history and wary of copyright’s censorship-like nature.33 They 
therefore included the perambulatory phrase in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the Constitution “to promote the Progress of Science” 
in part to establish that copyright is not to be used for censorship 
because its constitutional goal is to promote learning.34 Neverthe-
less, the propensity persists for private actors to invoke copyright 
as a tool to suppress criticism or other uses of which the author dis-
                                                                                                                            
28 See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 
(Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009); see also HARRY RANSOM, 
THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 29 (1956). 
29 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Guttenberg’s Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious 
Pluralism, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326–27, 391 (2003); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the 
Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 374 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, 
Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 
323–24 (2002); John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 294 (2015). 
30 PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 28, at 245. 
31 Id.; RANSOM, supra note 28, at 29. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
33 PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 28, at 376–77. 
34 Id. (“The Tudors and Stuarts used copyright to protect the populace from heretical, 
seditious, and schismatical material. The Framers (of the United States Constitution), 
drawing upon that experience, incorporated those lessons into the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment.”). 
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approves.35 Examples include political candidates seeking to pre-
vent a challenger’s use of their words,36 religious groups seeking to 
stifle the dissemination of religious texts for the purpose of criti-
cism,37 companies seeking to scour leaked documents from the 
Web,38 and public figures such as L. Ron Hubbard and J.D. Salin-
ger seeking to suppress the publication of unauthorized biogra-
phies.39 
The ties between copyright and censorship in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence can be overstated, however. For example, it is not 
even clear as a historical matter that censorship was the motivating 
factor behind the monarch’s grant of the Stationers’ charter.40 Fur-
thermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has argued that as a bulwark 
                                                                                                                            
35 See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169 (2007); Stephen McIntyre, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair 
Use as a Remedy for Private Censorship, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 61 (2012). 
36 See McIntyre, supra note 35, at 62–64 (describing a case in which one political 
candidate threatened to use copyright law to prevent a challenger from using the 
candidate’s own words in a political campaign). 
37 See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 
1290 (D. Utah 1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 
F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see generally Cotter, supra note 29. 
38 See, e.g., Paul Resnikoff, Sony Forces The Verge to Remove Its Spotify Contract..., 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (May 21, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/ 
2015/05/21/breaking-spotify-forces-the-verge-to-remove-its-sony-contract 
[http://perma.cc/S2NM-MYQE] (reporting that major record label Sony used a 
“copyright claim” to force online technology news site The Verge to take down a leaked 
contract between Sony Music and Internet music site Spotify). 
39 See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(biography of L. Ron Hubbard); New Era Publ’n Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 
(2d Cir. 1989) (biography of L. Ron Hubbard); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 
90 (2d Cir. 1987) (biography of J.D. Salinger). 
40 Copyright historian Ronan Deazley, for example, concludes that numerous sources 
and histories indicate that although the Tudor period was marred with press censorship, 
it “remained an essentially ad hoc and reactive phenomenon” and “both Mary and 
Elizabeth relied, not primarily upon the Company of Stationers, but on the use of 
statutory instruments and royal proclamations to censure heretical and treasonous texts.” 
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Stationers’ Royal Charter 1557, in PRIMARY SOURCES 
ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/commentary/uk_1557/uk_1557_com_972007121
517.html [http://perma.cc/P25S-UUXQ]. Historian John Feather likewise maintains that 
“[f]ar from being a ‘master-stroke of Elizabethan policy’ . . . the grant of the [Stationers’] 
Charter was a perfectly regular transaction for the commercial benefit of the gild of 
stationers which we may take to have been initiated by them.” JOHN FEATHER, A 
HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 30 (2d ed. 2005). 
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against exercises of copyright that unduly burden speech, U.S. 
copyright law incorporates specific free-speech accommodations, 
in particular the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression dichoto-
my.41 While these are often unwieldy in practice and hardly func-
tion perfectly to curb abusive uses of copyright,42 they are still po-
werful doctrines on which creators and courts routinely rely to 
create space for the unauthorized reproduction, dissemination, and 
transformation of protected works—especially for purposes of cri-
tiquing the author or her work. 
Lastly, and most importantly, although copyright law grants ex-
clusive rights that allow the author to limit the reproduction and 
dissemination of original expression, the intended net effect is to 
enhance rather than diminish free speech. Thus the U.S. Supreme 
Court has dubbed copyright an “engine of free expression”43 be-
cause copyright “establish[es] a marketable right to use one’s ex-
pression,” thereby supplying “the economic incentive to create 
and disseminate ideas.”44 This market-making function is often 
viewed as the primary rationale for copyright in American juri-
sprudence.45 According to commentators such as David Ladd and 
Neil Netanel, this function of copyright in fact does nothing less 
than undergird democracy.46 Because copyright “supports a mar-
ket-based sector of authors and publishers . . . who look to paying 
audiences (and advertisers) for financial sustenance,” authors need 
not look to government subsidies or elite or corporate patronage for 
financial support.47 This promotes free discourse because authors 
                                                                                                                            
41 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). For a discussion of the tension between 
copyright jurisprudence and the First Amendment, see Terry Hart, Artistic Expression, the 
First Amendment, and Copyright, COPYHYPE (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.copyhype.com/ 
2010/09/artistic-expression-the-first-amendment-and-copyright/ 
[http://perma.cc/3HJC-TJGW]. 
42 For a discussion of cases in which copyright was used primarily as a tool to suppress 
political or critical speech, see McIntyre, supra note 35. 
43 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
44 Id. 
45 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
46 David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 421, 427–28 (1983); see also NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 91 (2008); 
Netanel, supra note 25, at 341–64. 
47 NETANEL, supra note 46, at 91. 
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who are beholden to the government or elite or corporate patrons 
for their livelihoods are far more likely to self-censor, particularly 
with regard to speech that would undermine or offend the patron 
or benefactor. According to Netanel, this holds true even in an era 
of commercialized mass media for two reasons.48 First, copyright 
still helps support many smaller, independent voices outside the 
commercial mainstream that contribute to democratic discourse.49 
Second, commercial mass media, for its many failings, possesses 
the platform, resources, and heft to be a watchdog over powerbrok-
ers, shape and frame public discourse, and be a trusted, accounta-
ble intermediary.50 
B. Copyright and Censorship in China 
The theory that copyright provides structural support to exist-
ing democracies prompts the more challenging question of whether 
copyright can help affirmatively advance the cause of democracy in 
non-democratic countries such as China. This echoes a wider body 
of literature on the role that private property plays in advancing 
democracy.51 While a review of that literature is beyond the scope 
of this Article, it is worth noting the conclusions of property scho-
lar Carol Rose.52 After surveying numerous examples of privatiza-
tion initiatives around the globe and their democratizing effects (or 
lack thereof), Rose concludes that the effect of privatization on 
democratic reform is less inevitable or predictable than some theor-
ize, but it is still an important factor: “The take-away lesson is that 
privatization in a modern context is only one of a whole array of 
political reforms, though it is an important one.”53 This rings true 
in China, where herculean state-initiated privatization efforts over 
the past three decades have failed (by design) to yield much demo-
                                                                                                                            
48 Id. at 92–94. 
49 Id. at 93. 
50 Id. at 92–98. 
51 For an introduction, see generally Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to 
Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 (2006). For an intellectual property-focused 
comment on Professor Rose’s article, see Mark P. McKenna, Intellectual Property, 
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52 See Rose, supra note 51, at 720. 
53 Id. 
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cratic reform.54 Even if it fails to yield fundamental democratic re-
forms, however, introducing private incentives to the media and 
copyright industries distances them from the state, creating space 
for more voices and viewpoints. As Rose observes, following broad 
privatization efforts “[t]he Chinese press is not bold by Western 
standards, but it still is bolder than it was a few years ago.”55 Neil 
Netanel similarly argues that public exposure even to commercial 
media “tends to erode passive acceptance of authoritarian power 
relations” by “imparting an appreciation for innovation, enhancing 
audience ability to imagine themselves outside prevailing roles, and 
engendering a sense that individuals can act on their environment 
to achieve their personal and political goals.”56 
While copyright law is relatively new in China, censorship is 
not.57 “[S]ubstantial, sustained efforts” to control publication and 
dissemination of politically sensitive works date at least to the ad-
vent of the printing press during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 
A.D.), and have only increased in their intensity and extensiveness 
since.58 Today, potent and pervasive press and media control in 
China is effected through a byzantine latticework of bureaucratic 
agencies, formal policies and regulations, and informal pressure 
tactics that breed self-censorship. China consistently ranks near the 
bottom of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom In-
dex.59 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, copyright—a form of private infor-
mation control—sometimes appears bound up in state censorship 
policy and enforcement actions. Despite having among the world’s 
worst intellectual property enforcement records,60 China is home 
                                                                                                                            
54 See generally KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007). 
55 Rose, supra note 51, at 706–07. 
56 Neil W. Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 217, 260 (1998). 
57 See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 9–29. 
58 See id. at 13–17. 
59 See Press Freedom Index 2013, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org/ 
press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html [http://perma.cc/N87Q-4ZNE] (last visited Oct. 
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60 See generally Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY 
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to the highest volume of intellectual property enforcement in the 
world, even when controlling for population.61 Much of that en-
forcement on the copyright side is in the form of official campaigns 
that are notorious for producing grand enforcement spectacles, that 
have little meaningful effect on piracy.62 At least one major copy-
right enforcement campaign arose out of a broader censorship 
campaign aimed at eradicating pornographic materials.63 Stephen 
McIntyre therefore expresses concern that copyright infringement 
may provide Chinese authorities “with an opportunity—or, more 
cynically, an excuse—to crack down on expression that it considers 
threatening, such as political dissent, religious information, and 
other so-called ‘unhealthy’ media.”64 
Modern copyright in China has in fact been tied to censorship 
from its inception. Mao Zedong understood well the power of me-
dia and cultural products and their ability to shape ideology. His 
famous address on art and literature at Yan’An in 1942 and the 
contemporaneous Rectification Campaign were designed to weed 
out intellectual dissension and unify party thinking on the role of 
art and culture.65 Mao warned that proletarian co-optation of cul-
ture was a profound threat to the revolutionary cause, and es-
poused party control over cultural production.66 In delineating art 
and literature’s “proper” role in society, Mao invoked Lenin’s me-
taphor of art and literature as the “cogs and wheels” of the revolu-
tionary machinery.67 He then deftly combined the Leninist view 
                                                                                                                            
61 See MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 33 (2011). 
62 Id. at 221–26. 
63 See McIntyre, supra note 12, at 79. 
64 Id. 
65 See Kirk A. Denton, Literature and Politics: Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum 
on Art and Literature,” in THE COLUMBIA COMPANION TO MODERN EAST ASIAN 
LITERATURE 463, 463–64 (Joshua S. Moscow ed., 2003). 
66 Junhao Hong, Mao Zedong’s Cultural Theory and China’s Three Mass-Culture Debates: 
A Tentative Study of Culture, Society, and Politics, 4 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 87, 96 
(1994). 
67 See Denton, supra note 65, at 467; Alexander Des Forges, The Uses of Fiction: Liang 
Qichao and His Contemporaries, in THE COLUMBIA COMPANION TO MODERN EAST ASIAN 
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with the view of traditional Confucian scholars that literature 
should be morally edifying and politically subservient.68 
Just as the Soviet model of information control blended well 
with traditional views on Chinese literature, the Soviet approach to 
intellectual property proved a better fit for the new People’s Re-
public (founded in 1949) than did the copyright system of the pre-
ceding Republican era.69 The nationalist government of the Repub-
lican era (1912–1949) viewed instituting intellectual property laws 
as critical to the establishment of a modern legal system, and the 
first intellectual property measure passed was the Copyright Law 
of 1928.70 Highly influenced by German and Japanese copyright 
statutes,71 the 1928 law granted economic and moral rights to au-
thors for books, music, photographs, designs, sculpture, and other 
technical, literary, and artistic works for a term of the author’s life 
plus thirty years.72 The copyright law and related regulations con-
tained overt censorship provisions prohibiting copyright registra-
tion and publication of works deemed to violate the Guomindang 
“party spirit” or harm the “public order.”73 Nevertheless, the 
1928 copyright law was at its core premised on, in Professor Al-
ford’s words, “the existence of a marketplace of ideas.”74 Because 
Mao viewed information as subservient to Party policy and Confu-
cian tradition emphasized emulation of past forms over novelty,75 
the notion of a marketplace of ideas was, in Professor Alford’s 
view, “neither acceptable to the leadership of the Chinese Com-
munist Party nor previously witnessed in the Middle Kingdom.”76 
                                                                                                                            
68 Denton, supra note 65, at 467. 
69 See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 56–57. 
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71 Id. 
72 See Zhonghua Minguo Shiqi Nian Zhuzuo Quanfa (中华民国十七年著作权法) 
[Copyright Law of the Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nationalist Gov’t, May 
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In the early years of the People’s Republic, the Party ensured 
substantive control of popular creative works by restricting their 
production to work units under Party supervision.77 Following the 
Soviet example, Party policy recognized an author’s right to basic 
remuneration (usually based on the number of copies printed) and 
the right to prevent unauthorized alteration of the work.78 The Par-
ty-state fixed compensation levels that had little relationship to the 
market for the work.79 The outcome was, as intended, a centrally 
planned system of cultural production that resulted in creative out-
put consisting largely of thematically confined propaganda. As the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) drew to a close, China emerged 
from its isolationist shell to more deeply engage with the rest of the 
world. It became clear to Party leadership that comprehensive top-
down control of cultural production was unsustainable not only be-
cause the state could no longer bear the substantial costs but also 
because the narrow works of propaganda failed to satisfy rapidly 
diversifying consumer tastes in media and entertainment resulting 
in part from increasing cross-border cultural exchange.80 In 1979, as 
the combined result of these internal impetuses81 and exogenous 
pressure from the United States, whose authors’ works received no 
protection in China at that time,82 China embarked on the devel-
opment of the first modern copyright law in the history of the 
People’s Republic.83 
The resulting copyright law, promulgated in 1990, was shaped 
by nearly a decade of intense internal debate. Although some prom-
inent Chinese officials favored the development of a Western-style 
copyright law, support was far from unanimous.84 Still steeped in 
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socialism, politically orthodox officials questioned the wisdom of 
granting private rights in information goods and the resulting effect 
on state-owned media and the entire system of state press con-
trol.85 The debate about whether or not the copyright law should 
include provisions to ensure copyrighted works were ideologically 
“correct” only intensified following the 1989 Tiananmen pro-
tests.86 Ultimately, the law was drafted with an express censorship 
provision: Article 4 denied copyright protection to works “the pub-
lication or distribution of which is prohibited by law” and required 
that copyright owners, “in exercising their copyright, shall not vi-
olate the Constitution or laws or prejudice the public interests.”87 
Even in China, however, the relationship between copyright 
and censorship is often misunderstood or overstated. Some com-
mentators see stronger copyright protections as complementing 
and exacerbating state information controls by erecting even higher 
and thicker barriers around information.88 Much evidence points in 
the opposite direction, however. As a general matter, the Chinese 
government certainly need not rely on copyright to strengthen in-
formation controls when it wants, and there is little evidence that 
the government views copyright as a tool for enhancing censorship. 
In fact, evidence suggests that at least some in the Chinese gov-
ernment have long been wary of copyright’s free-speech enhancing 
capability. This wariness is reflected in the disagreement among 
Chinese officials, during the drafting of the 1990 Copyright Law, 
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86 MERTHA, supra note 82, at 125. 
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over the desirability of granting private rights in information 
goods.89 In another example, China’s National Copyright Adminis-
tration (“NCA”) is situated within the primary censoring body for 
literary works (the General Administration for Press and Publica-
tions (“GAPP”)), but Andrew Mertha suggests that in the past 
GAPP may have intentionally underfunded and undermined the 
NCA because of alleged concerns within GAPP about promoting 
private authorial rights and free-market information production.90 
Moreover, although Chinese copyright law was conceived as a 
hybrid author rights and press control law in China, it has since 
steadily progressed in favor of author rights and away from press 
control.91 Professor Hongsong Song attributes this trend largely to 
foreign pressure: continuous negotiations between the United 
States and China throughout the 1990s, during which the United 
States pushed China to lower its market barriers imposed by cen-
sorship policies, “can . . . be deemed to be not only a conflict be-
tween two countries, but also a form of struggle between state con-
trol and market forces.”92 Under foreign pressure, Chinese officials 
amended several areas in which the copyright law had facilitated 
press control, including a lack of performance rights in various 
types of works, certain statutory licensing provisions, and broad 
fair use provisions privileging certain state uses, all of which facili-
tated government use of copyrighted works for propaganda pur-
poses.93 To comply with its treaty obligations, China initially 
amended the provisions only with regard to foreign works, and 
maintained a dual system that discriminated against Chinese 
rightsholders for nearly a decade.94 
Further engagement with the global economy and intellectual 
property community drove an even deeper wedge between Chinese 
copyright law and its press-control roots. After joining the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001, China elevated domestic 
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rightsholders’ status to that of foreigners.95 Later, in 2007, the 
United States lodged a host of copyright-related complaints against 
China with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, aiming to disman-
tle censorship and market access controls that hampered U.S. cop-
yright owners’ ability to compete with piracy and monetize the 
Chinese market.96 Among its claims, the United States alleged that 
article 4 of China’s Copyright Law contravened China’s obliga-
tions under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property (“TRIPS”) and the Berne Convention by condition-
ing copyright protection on the formality of passing censorship re-
view, and by depriving unapproved works of required minimum 
standards of protection.97 U.S. copyright owners complained that 
article 4 afforded pirates a major legal safe harbor by arguably deny-
ing protection to all foreign works except those that had been sub-
mitted for, and successfully passed, censorship review.98 China re-
sponded that the Berne Convention expressly preserves members’ 
rights to censor works and prohibit their distribution.99 The WTO 
panel found that article 4 denied copyright protection to works that 
failed content review.100 Since the sovereign’s right to censor does 
not include the right to deny copyright protection, article 4 con-
flicted with China’s obligation under TRIPS and Berne to afford 
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substantive copyright rights.101 China subsequently amended the 
copyright law to delete the language from article 4 that denied cop-
yright protection to prohibited works.102 The practical benefit of 
this amendment for foreign copyright owners seeking improved 
copyright protection in China is doubtful,103 but the episode evi-
dences how foreign pressure to strengthen copyright protection 
checks the Chinese government’s ability to use copyright as a for-
mal censorship tool. 
In a parallel proceeding, the United States assailed the state-
run film import and distribution duopoly that China’s information 
control regime enables.104 Only one entity—the state-owned China 
Film Import and Export Corporation—holds the required permit 
to import films into China,105 while just two companies—China 
Film and Huaxia Film Distribution—are approved to distribute 
foreign films in China.106 The WTO Appellate Body found that 
China’s limiting of audiovisual distribution services to state-owned 
Chinese enterprises breaches China’s commitments to permit 
market access without discrimination.107 Following the 2009 deci-
sion, China did not reform its import or distribution regulations, 
but it did at least agree to increase the number of foreign films 
permitted for theatrical release each year.108 
Thus, Professor Song concludes that “exogenous pressure con-
strained the power of the Chinese government to reshape copyright 
law to suit the needs of press control,” but “[t]he nearly decade-
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long double standard problem in copyright protection [during 
which foreign works received broader rights than domestic works] 
reveals just how reluctant the Party-state has been to remove the 
imprints of press control from China’s copyright law.”109 As these 
examples illustrate, censorship and market forces enabled by copy-
right are in considerable tension. While stronger copyright protec-
tions and market forces do not always undercut press controls, they 
have consistently chipped away at them for more than two decades. 
Nevertheless, scholars such as Neil Netanel and Peter Yu warn 
of potential harms that could result from instituting strong and ef-
fective copyright regimes in authoritarian states, such as China, 
that limit market access.110 Strong copyright under such conditions 
could result in a net welfare loss by limiting the penetration—and 
potential democratizing effect—of unapproved foreign works, 
which are widely disseminated via pirate networks.111 Foreign 
works can, after all, expose audiences in authoritarian states to al-
ternative viewpoints, lifestyles, and systems of government.112 Tak-
ing into account the free speech implications of the nexus between 
copyright protection and market access is an important point. Fo-
cusing on the potential democratizing effects of foreign works, 
however, risks undervaluing the potential influence of a strong do-
mestic industry buoyed by copyright. As argued below, a strong 
domestic film industry has the resources to communicate diverse 
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perspectives through more culturally resonant domestic produc-
tions, even in the guise of “officially sanctioned” content.113 
II. THE FILM MARKET AND CENSORSHIP IN CHINA 
This Part introduces the history of Chinese film as a state con-
trolled medium of expression, with an emphasis on the historical 
interplay between censorship and the market. Throughout the his-
tory of Chinese film, and particularly in the present day, authorities 
have used a multilayered censorship approach in order to maximize 
compliance while minimizing the administrative burden on the 
state. First and most conspicuously, the state imposes direct con-
tent controls that withhold information from public consumption. 
These generally come in two flavors: production controls (e.g., 
centrally planned projects, script approval requirements, etc.) and 
post hoc review (pre-release screening and editing).114 Both types 
remain prevalent in China today. Second, Chinese authorities have 
employed strict licensing or permitting rules designed to limit pro-
duction and distribution functions to approved entities only. Third, 
Chinese authorities have imposed restrictions on investment and 
ownership in film production and distribution entities.115 Fourth, 
the state, especially today, relies heavily on self-censorship: pro-
duction companies are responsible for policing the content they 
produce and face the prospect of punishment for any transgression. 
Fifth, the state encourages compliance by employing subsidies, fa-
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vorable release windows, and other incentives for “good beha-
vior.”116 Sixth, to induce self-censorship, authorities impose penal-
ties against those deemed to have transgressed censorship rules. 
One common penalty is a multi-year filmmaking ban.117 Seventh, 
the state has imposed varying degrees of restrictions and bans on 
foreign films. Presently, China caps annual imports at thirty-four 
films for revenue-sharing theatrical release (of which fourteen must 
be in “enhanced” formats such as IMAX or 3-D) and restricts for-
eign firms’ participation in China’s film production, importation, 
and distribution sectors. (China also reportedly imports an addi-
tional thirty to forty foreign films annually on a non-revenue-
sharing, flat fee basis.)118 
As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, however, for much 
of the history of Chinese cinema there has been—and continues to 
be—a productive tension between censorship rules and the market. 
This tension puts practical limits on how and to what degree the 
state can control content. 
A. Early Narrative Films and May Fourth Cinema 
The Chinese film industry has existed for nearly as long as 
moving pictures have existed as a medium of expression, and con-
tent control has been part of the landscape for much of that time. 
The first motion picture was exhibited in China in 1896,119 and the 
first Chinese silent feature films were produced in the early 
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1920s.120 At that time, Chinese art and culture remained highly in-
fluenced by the May Fourth Movement (1917–1921), in which the 
Chinese government’s perceived weakness in the face of Japanese 
aggression triggered nationalism, student and worker protests, and 
broader reform efforts aimed at exalting Western science and dem-
ocratic values and undermining Confucian tradition.121 Although 
the melodramas of the 1920s were highly commercial (and ex-
tremely popular) mass entertainment, and were shunned as such by 
many May Fourth intellectuals,122 some early feature films did re-
flect societal concerns of the times, infusing simple stories with so-
cial and political meaning.123 Some of the most influential early 
Chinese filmmakers viewed themselves as educators as well as en-
tertainers, although their narratives unfailingly sought to promote 
traditional values.124 One of China’s great screenplay writers of the 
1920s, the Harvard-educated Hong Shen, refused to depict in his 
films topics that might morally mislead the public, such as porno-
graphy, immortals and demons, criminal activity, exposing human 
vices, and exposing the nation’s shortcomings.125 Indeed, these 
very themes are technically forbidden under Chinese law today.126 
Hong’s early act of “self-censorship” underscores how deeply 
entwined notions of moral cultivation have been with cultural pro-
duction in China, and how paternalism and concerns about the cor-
ruptive potential of film (and art more broadly) long predate the 
establishment of the People’s Republic. 
Many early film critics were especially preoccupied with film’s 
unique educative potential.127 They viewed film’s capacity to deliv-
er moral and nationalistic messages to the masses as a critical peda-
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gogical tool that could fill the void left by the failed school systems 
across China.128 Accordingly, many critics mistrusted the market 
and decried profit-oriented filmmaking.129 The tension between 
moralism and commercialism even famously manifested itself with-
in studios, leading to creative tensions between executives who 
emphasized the need to produce a hit versus those who worried 
about doing so at the expense of virtuous inculcation.130 
B. The 1930s: Censorship Under the Guomindang 
The 1930s are often regarded as a golden age of Chinese cine-
ma,131 ushering in a new level of artistic maturity and social con-
sciousness and witnessing the first earnest efforts to incorporate 
progressive May Fourth themes into film.132 Audiences began to 
appreciate film not only as entertainment but also as a therapeutic 
medium for communicating contemporary problems facing indi-
viduals and society133—a critical function following decades of war, 
warlordism, and imperialism. Leftist films emerged as artistically 
and politically important during this period, although their general 
popularity at the time is in doubt.134 
Censorship by the Guomindang government (and the foreign 
powers occupying Shanghai) also emerged as a ubiquitous feature 
of the film industry.135 Like the Communist Party that succeeded it, 
the Guomindang engaged in two kinds of censorship: social and 
political. Social censorship aimed primarily at enhancing Guomin-
dang nation-building efforts by eliminating sex and superstition 
from films, and prioritizing Mandarin films over Cantonese-dialect 
and foreign films.136 Political censorship primarily targeted leftist 
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films, which were seen as an ideological threat.137 While censorship 
was widespread—in 1933 nearly a quarter of features produced in 
China were banned138—it appears to have been inconsistently en-
forced and consisted mostly of post hoc bans and revisions, with 
little direct interference in the production process. In a foresha-
dowing of the censor-market dialog that plays a significant role in 
today’s Chinese film industry, Guomindang censors were sympa-
thetic to the economic hardships that plagued film studios, particu-
larly the smaller ones, and established policies to help minimize the 
economic effects of censorship and even give objectionable or 
banned films an opportunity to at least partially recoup their 
costs.139 Guomindang censors even agreed to allow “banned” films 
to enjoy a limited public release to help the producers recoup their 
investments.140 
C. The Mao Era: Socialist Production and Party Domination 
Cinema during the Mao period (1949–1976) was primarily cha-
racterized by conformity and uniformity born of centralized state 
control and production quotas disconnected from market prefe-
rences. Film production went through three phases that profoundly 
affected the nature of films produced during the period: nationali-
zation of the private studios (1949–1952), socialist realism (1953–
1966), and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).141 In Mao’s view, 
cinema was a powerful ideological medium and its proper function 
was to disseminate correct Party ideology.142 Hollywood films, 
which were extremely popular in parts of China previously, were 
banned and not officially permitted again until years after the Mao 
era.143 
In the earliest years of the PRC, the Party cooperated with and 
subsidized private studios, which initially released dozens of prop-
aganda films. The party’s censorship policies were opaque, howev-
er, and guessing what Chairman Mao would deem to be politically 
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correct proved perilous for filmmakers. Accomplished Shanghai-
based director Sun Yu found himself at the center of a political fire-
storm when he released The Life of Wu Xun (武训传), the most 
ambitious of the privately produced propaganda features. Although 
the film sought to glorify the Communist revolution, Mao exco-
riated it for incorrectly depicting Chinese history and portraying 
peasants as reformers rather than revolutionaries.144 Feature film 
production in state-owned studios ground to a halt for more than a 
year as the industry stagnated in political uncertainty, while Party 
officials and the press rained down criticism on private studios.145 
By 1953, all the private studios in China were nationalized.146 
Commentators theorize that Mao used the Wu Xun campaign to 
cow the comparatively Westernized Shanghai studios, signal that 
politics would now trump artistic expression, and cement the Par-
ty’s role—and Mao’s role in particular—as the arbiter of political 
correctness.147 In one stroke, through the Wu Xun campaign, Mao 
“consolidated his power position within the [Communist Party] 
leadership and crushed the naïve dream of creative freedom held 
by all artists, no matter what credentials they might possess.”148 
The ensuing “socialist realism” period was named after the 
Party’s credo that films should depict socialism with simultaneous 
realism and idealism.149 The period witnessed the expansion of the 
Chinese film industry, albeit under the complete control of the Par-
ty.150 With the film apparatus secured within the bureaucracy, the 
state invested heavily in film education and the development of 
new film technologies.151 The style and substance of socialist real-
ism were confined to limited, politically acceptable parameters: the 
films were generally serious in tone (often set in wartime) and sub-
limated character development and style to political exemplarity, 
depicting model protagonists locked in class struggle.152 Neverthe-
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less, resourceful filmmakers of this period found room for artistic 
expression and stylistic innovation within the confines of political 
orthodoxy, particularly in the genres of ethnic minority film, tradi-
tional theater and opera film, and animation.153 A number of these 
films were popular in China, and some even found popularity and 
critical acclaim abroad in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Europe.154 
Overall, however, the socialist realism period was a trying and 
dangerous time for filmmakers, and a disappointment for Chinese 
cinema. Outspoken filmmakers, emboldened to air criticisms dur-
ing the 1956 One Hundred Flowers Campaign, decried an epidemic 
of poor box office performance.155 Film critic Zhong Dianfei public-
ly noted at the time that socialist films’ target audience—workers, 
peasants, and soldiers—showed little interest in them.156 He 
blamed poor attendance on state interference in the creative 
process and repression of directors’ individual artistic styles.157 
Immediate reforms in response to the criticisms gave individual 
studios more artistic control, and the fruits of the reforms were 
unmistakable: production doubled and new themes, styles and ge-
nres proliferated.158 Mao and the Party leaders soon turned on their 
critics,159 however, and numerous high-profile filmmakers were 
discredited or banned during the ensuing Anti-Rightist Movement 
of 1957.160 While film production continued apace for the next sev-
eral years, the Anti-Rightist Movement dashed any hope that so-
cialist cinema would see significant stylistic and artistic progress 
under Mao. 
Chinese cinema reached its nadir in 1966–1969—the tumultu-
ous first three years of the Cultural Revolution, when feature film 
production ceased entirely.161 In his call for a new socialist revolu-
tion in the sphere of culture, Mao denounced the previous seven-
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teen years of socialist filmmaking.162 For the remainder of the Cul-
tural Revolution, film production consisted of a handful of model 
revolutionary plays and operas and, later, feature films in line with 
the political and aesthetic values of the ultra-leftists and Mao’s 
wife Jiang Qing.163 In short, some stylistic innovations and artistic 
achievements occurred during the Mao era, but style and art were 
severely stunted overall by their relentless subordination to poli-
tics.164 
D. The 1980s: Transition, Liberalization, and the “Fifth Generation” 
Auteurs 
Following Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution 
in 1976, China embarked on a new period of modernization, eco-
nomic reform, and international reengagement. China eagerly cast 
off the repression and stagnation of the Cultural Revolution and 
embarked on a new era of economic liberalization and technological 
modernization under Deng Xiaoping. State investment resumed in 
film production, which had slowed to a crawl during the Cultural 
Revolution.165 
From 1977 until the early 1990s, film production remained 
within the centrally controlled state studio system established un-
der Mao.166 While political oversight and censorship remained a 
fact of life for filmmakers even throughout this period, there was 
more room for creative maneuvering than in the previous three 
decades. For example, several influential films that were initially 
banned were ultimately released in China within a few years or 
even months after officially being declared “illegal.”167 Some of 
China’s most celebrated directors—often referred to collectively as 
the “Fifth Generation”—emerged during this period, including 
Zhang Yimou, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and Chen Kaige. These direc-
tors felt relatively free to experiment with ideological critique and 
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auteurism.168 They were also unconstrained by market considera-
tions, as production remained entirely state-subsidized.169 Direc-
tors in the state studio system could produce the films they wanted 
within the allocated budget.170 They were unaccountable for—but 
also unable to partake financially in—their films’ success.171 
Thematically, Fifth Generation films were iconoclastic and dis-
tanced themselves stylistically and thematically from the films of 
previous generations—particularly social realist cinema.172 The 
Fifth Generation directors deconstructed revolutionary history and 
undermined socialist mythology. Chen Kaige’s 1984 film Yellow 
Earth (黄土地), for example, portrays rural mountain villagers who 
resist change and are unresponsive to a Communist cadre’s indoc-
trination attempts.173 Through its minimalist plot and fragmented 
narrative, the film counters the stylistic conventions of socialist 
realism and the myth that peasants readily embraced socialism.174 
The Fifth Generation’s films received accolades abroad, but they 
generally flopped with domestic audiences, for whom the avant-
garde stylings probably seemed foreign and impenetrable.175 
While censors granted far more leeway in the 1980s than in the 
Mao era,176 censorship was still prevalent if less intrusive.177 The 
deadly crackdown on protestors at Tiananmen in 1989 cooled the 
more permissive ideological environment that filmmakers enjoyed 
earlier in the decade, but it did not precipitate a return to Mao-era 
levels of control.178 Instead, it seems to have prompted the Party to 
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divert resources away from art films and invest heavily in the pro-
duction of “main melody” films—propaganda films designed to 
reinstall correct political ideology and nationalism.179 It might also 
have disillusioned some filmmakers, causing them to desert politi-
cal ideals and whole-heartedly embrace commercialism.180 
E. 1990s: Economic Reform and Hollywood’s Reintroduction 
Maintaining a fully state-supported film sector disassociated 
from the market was untenable. Box office numbers declined dras-
tically through the late 1980s and early 1990s due to a lack of popu-
lar interest in much of the domestic cinema, a lack of foreign films, 
and a panoply of new entertainment options competing for con-
sumers’ discretionary income. Declines in box office returns trig-
gered a vicious cycle. Decreased revenue begat lower investment in 
production. In 1992, the most expensive Chinese film produced 
cost a mere $187,500.181 In addition, the government still enforced 
a production quota of 120 films per year, further spreading budgets 
thin.182 The low investment undermined film quality, rendering 
film products even less attractive to audiences.183 By 1993, many 
Chinese studios had to rely on co-production arrangements with 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong studios in order to produce films.184 In 
just one year, between 1992 and 1993, purely domestic productions 
had fallen by fifty percent, audience attendance by sixty percent, 
and box office returns and distribution net income by forty per-
cent.185 
By this time, many areas of China’s economy were undergoing 
profound economic reform, and the need for market-based reform 
in the film sector became self-evident. In 1993, the Ministry of Ra-
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dio, Film, and Television (“MRFT”) outlined a plan for transi-
tioning state production and distribution to a market-based model, 
emphasizing film’s economic function and, in the words of Profes-
sor Ying Zhu, “endorsing a cinematic practice not necessarily in 
alignment with film’s pedagogical function.”186 The state-run stu-
dios, which were still the only studios permitted to produce films at 
this time, concentrated their reform efforts primarily on downsiz-
ing, internal restructuring, talent outsourcing, and tying employee 
bonuses to profits.187 While the reforms improved studio manage-
ment, they did little to solve several root causes of the studios’ 
troubles: low revenue, lack of sufficient financing, and lack of crea-
tivity and modern film production standards as a result of decades 
of filmmakers working under state patronage and censorship.188 
Most importantly, the reform efforts did nothing to bring au-
diences back to theaters.189 
Market-based reforms and officials’ urgent desire to jump-start 
the domestic film market led to the repealing of the ban on theatri-
cal exhibition of revenue-sharing foreign films in the mid-1990s.190 
Authorities hoped that by showing a limited number of Western 
films, with their higher production values and wider range of sub-
ject matter, audiences would be enticed back into theaters and re-
kindle the movie-going habit, reenergizing the market for domestic 
films in the process.191 In 1994, the MRFT issued a reform measure 
permitting the import of ten foreign films per year (mostly Holly-
wood blockbusters) for theatrical release on a revenue-sharing ba-
sis.192 Following China’s entry into the WTO, that number 
doubled.193 In 2012, Chinese authorities again increased the num-
ber, this time to thirty-four.194 This course of action by the MRFT 
had little to do with ideology and everything to do with the market 
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(and international pressure—also a function of the market). Even 
the first few waves of Hollywood films contained movies that were 
expected to perform well at the box office but potentially raised 
thorny content issues at the time, such as Oliver Stone’s violent 
and political Natural Born Killers and John Woo’s violent action 
film Broken Arrow.195 
During this period, Chinese officials also actively wooed Hol-
lywood in an effort to entice foreign investment in new productions 
and gain foreign distribution for Chinese films. Chinese officials 
crowed that co-productions are treated as domestic productions 
and therefore provide an avenue for Hollywood studios to circum-
vent the import cap and receive twice the revenue share of im-
ported films.196 Chinese officials also promised to grant “preferen-
tial consideration” in the Chinese market to foreign companies that 
purchased overseas distribution rights for Chinese films.197 Warner 
Bros. and Twentieth Century Fox are reportedly two major studios 
that developed favorable relationships with Chinese officials by 
purchasing such rights.198 
The reintroduction of Hollywood was not the only major step 
that the MRFT took in 1995 to revitalize Chinese film production. 
To help domestic producers compete with the onslaught of im-
ports, the MRFT made policy changes to open up the film produc-
tion sector. Prior to 1995, only sixteen licensed state-owned studios 
could invest in and produce films.199 The MRFT loosened its li-
censing policy to permit provincial level studios to participate in 
film production.200 More importantly, it opened up film production 
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to outside investors201 (later regulations clarified that outside inves-
tors eligible to invest in film production do not include wholly for-
eign-owned entities, although foreign companies could invest 
through joint ventures with Chinese entities).202 In addition, the 
studio reforms of the mid-1990s, partly as a result of Hollywood’s 
reintroduction, led to reforms in the distribution sector that opened 
it up to private investment and Hollywood-style vertically inte-
grated marketing and management in which the film producer, dis-
tributor, and exhibitor shared in profits and losses.203 
By the end of 1995, the MRFT’s plan appeared to have worked. 
Audiences returned to theaters in droves to see the “big ten” Hol-
lywood imports, and the return of the theater-going habit gave do-
mestic films an immediate boost.204 Private investment flooded in-
to domestic film production. With Hollywood production values 
now setting the standard, Chinese producers were forced to ac-
knowledge that quality films with high production values were key 
to attracting audiences, and several large budget Chinese films 
were released that year. While the Hollywood imports claimed se-
venty to eighty percent of the Chinese box office in 1995, domestic 
films fared admirably: domestic co-production Red Cherry, which 
was the number one domestic film that year, surpassed most of the 
Hollywood blockbusters.205 It also quickly became apparent that 
private investment was key to producing films that could compete 
in this new landscape, as the majority of the state-run studio pro-
ductions were “box-office turkeys” in 1995.206 
The Chinese film industry’s resurgence was exceedingly short-
lived, however, because state censors reinserted themselves. In an 
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atmosphere in which the rapid onset of commercial culture re-
sulted in “spiritually polluting” literature, music, and art,207 film 
also entered the crosshairs of culture authorities. Private profiteers 
inexperienced at filmmaking rushed to enter the fray, and the proli-
feration of low budget films depicting gratuitous sex and violence 
dismayed officials.208 The MRFT called for the production of ten 
“quality” domestic films (which studios interpreted to mean main 
melody films) annually209 and, in order to provide further protec-
tion, revenue, and concomitant investment in domestic produc-
tion, they required exhibitors to allocate no more than one-third of 
their screen time to foreign films.210 In 1996, therefore, the dimi-
nished screen time for foreign films and the devotion of much of 
the remaining screen time to socialist hero main melody films 
turned away audiences and private investors alike.211 The tighten-
ing of state control over studios at this time “resulted in monoton-
ous cinematic representation and the avoidance of controversial 
contemporary subjects more attuned to the concerns of ordinary 
moviegoers.”212 Another consequence was that some film exhibi-
tors, sensing the domestic studios’ anxiety over the marketability 
of their main melody films, exploited the studios by demanding 
they take lower revenue shares and cover costs not customarily 
borne by the studio.213 
Despite the market-oriented transition and promising devel-
opments for Chinese filmmakers, censorship remained a consistent 
drag on the industry’s reform efforts.214 Inconsistent, shifting, and 
opaque censorship rules often led filmmakers to err on the side of 
caution and avoid controversial subjects of the day, or invest in po-
litically (though not economically) safe main melody productions, 
giving film practitioners experience producing only a narrow range 
of films.215 Therefore, as Professor Zhu notes, “even when film 
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reform returned to the Chinese filmmakers much of the control 
over their creative processes and products, they had difficulty in 
making the transition from a cinema of propaganda to a cinema of 
popular appeal and commercial entertainment.”216 Nevertheless, 
the 1990s witnessed the advent of key reforms that would save the 
Chinese film industry a decade later, spurred by commercializa-
tion: modernization and privatization of the production and distri-
bution sectors, and the introduction of foreign content, capital, and 
expertise into the Chinese film market. 
F. 2000 to the Present: The Rise of China’s Film Industry 
The problems that plagued the industry in the 1990s, coupled 
with rampant VCD and DVD piracy,217 continued to stunt the Chi-
nese film industry’s growth well into the new millennium. As re-
cently as 2005, annual box office revenue in China amounted to 
just $250 million (inclusive of both foreign and domestic films)—a 
mere three percent of the U.S. box office total that year.218 
However, the seeds of future success were sewn when, in the 
1990s, officials permitted private investment in theaters and distri-
bution.219 By 2014, China had replaced Japan as the world’s second 
largest box office.220 China’s 2014 box office proceeds reached 
$4.76 billion, and by 2016 China is likely to become the first coun-
try besides the United States to cross the $5 billion sales threshold 
in a single year.221 The confluence of three factors has resulted in 
an unprecedented Chinese film industry boom.222 First, the past 
decade has witnessed a meteoric rise in the number of theaters. 
Today, theater chains are building 5,000 screens per year in China, 
which now boasts 25,000 screens nationwide223—more than 
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double the number of screens that existed in 2011.224 Screen instal-
lations were initially concentrated in first-tier cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai but now even fifth and sixth-tier cities are experienc-
ing the boom.225 Second, the quality of the movie-going experience 
has improved dramatically during the past decade. This includes 
quality of the physical spaces in which films are exhibited as state-
of-the-art cinemas with stadium seating, IMAX screens, and 3-D 
projection proliferate nationwide.226 It also includes a significant 
rise in content quality as the number of imports and co-productions 
with high production values increases and purely homegrown pro-
ductions, spurred by global competition, improve dramatically. 
Third, Chinese consumers’ discretionary spending has increased 
markedly—particularly that of young, white collar Chinese who are 
the most avid filmgoers.227 Although first-run blockbuster films can 
cost as much as twenty-six to twenty-eight dollars per ticket,228 
moviegoing has become an essential social and leisurely pursuit for 
many young Chinese.229 
China’s domestic film industry has grown with the meteoric 
rise in box office revenue. Currently, box office receipts for domes-
tic films are about equal to that of foreign films,230 and six of the ten 
highest grossing films in China are domestic productions, all of 
which were released in 2010 or later.231 Some of this assuredly de-
rives from economic protectionist policies instituted in the 1990s, 
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such as limiting the annual screen time available to foreign films232 
and instituting “blackout” periods during which only domestic 
films can be shown.233 However, there are signs that the Chinese 
film industry is now successfully competing on its merits.234 Hol-
lywood films, which are exceedingly popular in first tier cites such 
as Beijing and Shanghai, are less popular in other, less cosmopoli-
tan cities.235 Audiences in these cities are more interested in local 
fare emphasizing themes that resonate with their experiences and 
feature popular Chinese television stars.236 According to Variety, a 
major U.S. film industry trade publication, in 2013 China produced 
domestic “megahits” at a rate of about one per month, and about 
half of those were by first-time or little-known directors.237 In any 
event, rumblings are steadily growing that, as a result of U.S. pres-
sure, the import cap will be raised yet again or removed altogether 
by 2017.238 If other market access barriers are lifted as well, Chi-
nese filmmakers will be forced to compete on the quality and at-
tractiveness of their content alone. 
The effect of commercialization on both Chinese film produc-
tion and censorship practices over the past decade is palpable. By 
the turn of the century, entertaining the potentially enormous au-
dience in China—and scoring the associated potential riches—had 
become most Chinese filmmakers’ focus, rather than producing 
state-sponsored main melody films for the state or art-house films 
for a small circle of critics.239 At that time, to keep from running 
afoul of censors, producers tended to stick to a few dominant 
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themes considered noncontroversial: histories (that did not twist 
the Party’s historical narrative), martial arts films (exemplified by 
Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Zhang Yimou’s Hero, 
and Peter Chan Ho-sun’s The Warlords),240 and urban comedies 
(exemplified by Feng Xiaogang’s wildly successful satirical come-
dies about modern life).241 However, the narrow subject matter 
range made the films difficult to differentiate.242 Established direc-
tors with bankable names made many of these films, especially in 
the history and martial arts genres. Up-and-coming directors and 
former “underground” filmmakers that sought mainstream accep-
tance and success, on the other hand, have continually needed to 
distinguish themselves. They have done so by pushing the 
envelope of acceptable content,243 and many have sought to bring 
that edge to the commercial mainstream.244 As Variety magazine 
recently wrote in a cover story on the rise of China’s domestic film 
industry, “[y]oung filmmakers are no longer forced to work under-
ground and have chipped away at the regulators’ hard lines (and 
their own cautionary self-censorship) to produce genre films in 
formats from horror to thriller to romantic comedy.”245 
High-profile co-productions and foreign investment in films 
such as Looper, a sci-fi thriller about futuristic hit-men who travel 
to China sixty years in the future, Transformers: Age of Extinction, 
and Iron Man 3 provide three things that Chinese officials particu-
larly value: capital, training, and high production values. However, 
such films need to generate strong returns in order for financiers 
and producers to invest in future China projects. Forcing produc-
ers of such films to strictly adhere to regulations that forbid emi-
nently marketable subject matter such as violence, murder, the un-
derworld, crime, sex or sexual innuendo, and horror would (for bet-
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ter or worse) greatly hamper their ability to market the films. This 
is especially true for filmmakers seeking to produce globally mar-
ketable films in China: censoring authorities simply must take into 
account global tastes and consumption habits when reviewing 
films. Although some co-productions, including Looper and Iron 
Man 3, result in two prints—one for Chinese consumption and one 
for global consumption246—the Chinese version might even con-
tain more, rather than less content in order to ensure that it con-
tains proportionally sufficient “Chinese” themes to qualify for co-
production status, and to make it more attractive to Chinese au-
diences.247 
In sum, this Part has aimed to demonstrate that autocratic, 
complete top-down control of the film industry is an aberration of 
the Mao era. Indeed, the history of China’s film industry demon-
strates that despotic dominion over film production is neither sus-
tainable nor desirable, even from the state’s point of view. While 
censorship—in celebrated director Feng Xiaogang’s words—
“torments”248 China’s filmmakers and has done so throughout 
much of history, censorship has also been tempered by market de-
mands and by the ineluctable impulse of filmmakers to differentiate 
themselves from their forebears, to satiate those market demands, 
or both. That said, the market clearly is not all-powerful. Chinese 
producers still create under the pall of a pervasive censorship appa-
ratus, and while the scope of acceptable subject matter today may 
be far broader than in past decades, the censorship process remains 
opaque and ad hoc, and there are major political and social themes 
of central importance to Chinese society that remain off limits. 
Films directly criticizing the Party, its ideology, or its leaders 
would be wildly successful if officially released,249 but those and 
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many other subjects plainly remain untouchable, demonstrating the 
limits of the market’s power over censors. The next Part considers 
whether the gains that market forces have made are meaningful to 
Chinese society despite the obvious limitations. 
III. COPYRIGHT-INDUCED LIBERALIZATION OF CHINA’S 
CENSORSHIP PRACTICES AND RULES 
This Part considers whether the market-induced liberalizations 
of China’s film censorship practices and rules have led to meaning-
ful gains over time in terms of expressive freedom in China’s film 
market. “Free expression” here can be evaluated along two dimen-
sions: (1) plurality of voices and viewpoints in films lawfully distri-
buted in China, and (2) diversity of approved film subject matter. 
Changes along these dimensions can be observed through the ex-
tent to which market pressures lead to formal liberalization of the 
rules or films technically violate censorship rules. 
To aid this inquiry, this Part first provides a very brief outline 
of pertinent censorship rules. It then analyzes how these rules have 
been applied in practice or have changed as a result of market pres-
sures. Lastly, this Part draws from political science literature on 
Chinese economic reform to provide a theoretical basis for arguing 
that the selective enforcement of rules, combined with (or indeed 
driven by) market forces and economic realities, can lead to mea-
ningful (albeit not absolute) liberalization and reform of formal 
rules. 
A. China’s Film Censorship Regulations 
As noted at the beginning of Part II, the Chinese government 
uses a multilayered censorship approach that involves content cen-
sorship, licensing and permitting requirements, investment restric-
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tions, self-censorship, rewards and subsidies, and import restric-
tions.250 This Section will briefly introduce the censorship regula-
tions most pertinent to this discussion, in particular, film content 
censorship rules, permitting requirements, and investment restric-
tions. 
As films and filmmakers, both foreign and domestic, proliferate 
in China, the state has sought to maintain a tight grip on content 
and production through restrictive content and licensing require-
ments. Throughout the 1990s, the government issued a series of 
regulations that outlined rules concerning media entity ownership 
and verboten content.251 Article 3 of the 1994 Audiovisual Product 
Management Regulations enumerated a list of six general catego-
ries of forbidden content, which are repeated in more recent regu-
lations: 
(1) Content that endangers the unity and territorial 
integrity of the nation and sovereignty of the 
State; 
(2) Content that incites the division of the 
ethnicities and undermines national solidarity; 
(3) Content that divulges State secrets; 
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(4) Content that propagates obscenity and 
superstition or glorifies violence; 
(5) Content that slanders or insults others; [and] 
(6) Other content of which the publication and 
dissemination are prohibited by State 
provisions.252 
Clearly, much of this list targets content viewed as seditious 
and politically sensitive, although it does touch broadly on socially 
objectionable content as well, such as violence and slanderousness. 
(These, too, however, have political undertones, as showing scenes 
of graphic violence can in theory lead to unruliness and political 
instability, and “slanderous” content may target party officials or 
Revolutionary figures.) Of particular note are the list’s vagueness 
and the exceptional breadth of subject matter that it covers. In-
deed, item six essentially affords the Party-state carte blanche to 
censor content at will. The Chinese word for “provisions” (规定) 
is a broad term that could be interpreted to include any rule or sti-
pulation that originates from a state organ. Hence, if any state or-
gan, including the censoring body, declares something to be illegal, 
that content violates article 3(6). In any event, nothing in the film 
regulations requires authorities to provide a justification for ban-
ning a film or requiring revisions, and they often do not provide 
one. Unsurprisingly, filmmakers lament the ad hoc nature of cen-
sorship: 
The censorship system is very ridiculous, for there 
is no standard. They say, “Your films are illegal,” 
and then I ask, “What is the relevant film law? 
Which clause do my films violate?” No, there is no 
specific law. So the censorship is quite cruel. If they 
say your film is “illegal,” it is “illegal.”253 
In keeping with the traditional Chinese view that expressive 
works are morally and psychologically influential and therefore 
should edify with “correct” ideology and positive themes and im-
agery, the 2006 Film Management Regulations (promulgated by 
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the MRFT’s successor, the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (“SARFT”))254 encourage filmmakers to produce 
films that “support healthy and beneficial culture, strive to trans-
form backward culture, [and] determinedly resist degenerate cul-
ture.”255 The 2006 regulation contains the same list of verboten 
political subject matter as the 1994 regulation quoted above, but 
enumerates additional censorship-worthy topics, with an emphasis 
on such socially “unhealthy” or corrupting subject matter as vi-
olence, horror, graphic sexuality, criminal activity, showing the 
dark side of modern Chinese society, or simply presenting a pessi-
mistic rather than uplifting outlook on life.256 Specifically, accord-
ing to the 2006 regulation, any film must be edited or revised if it: 
 disagrees with or alters Party narratives about 
historical facts and individuals, including 
“twisting Chinese culture and Chinese history, 
gravely violating historical facts,” or criticizing 
Revolutionary heroes, the army, or the police; 
 contains graphic sexual content including the 
depiction of “promiscuity, rape, prostitution, 
sexual behavior, homosexuality, masturbation, 
male and female genitalia and other intimate 
parts; intermittent filthy lines, songs, 
background music and sound effects;” 
 contains horror, violence, monsters, and gore; 
 “blur[s] the basic nature of righteousness and 
unrighteousness; sedulously display[s] unlawful 
or criminal aggressiveness and arrogance;” 
 graphically portrays violence or crimes such as 
murder, drug use, and gambling; 
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 portrays “bad habits” such as excessive 
drinking and smoking; 
 casts police in a negative light by showing 
prisoner abuse or “extortion of confession by 
torturing criminals or criminal suspects;” 
 portrays society and life in a dark, negative, or 
dispiriting manner; 
 “advocates religious extremism,” provokes 
conflicts between worshippers of different 
religions or between believers and non-believers, 
or hurts “the feelings of the masses;” 
 “propagates the destruction of the natural 
environment, abuse of animals, catching, killing 
and eating of State-protected animals;” or 
 generally violates “the spirit of relevant laws 
and regulations.”257 
In addition to the more formal content regulations, SARFT al-
so issues sporadic “notices.”258 For example, SARFT’s 2011 ban 
on television dramas containing time travel plot elements arrived in 
the form of an ad hoc notice.259 Time travel dramas reportedly 
raised SARFT’s ire following the extreme popularity of several se-
rials in which a modern-day protagonist travels back in time and 
consorts, often romantically, with well-known historical figures.260 
While such plot devices seem innocuous enough, they can under-
mine official histories or visions of the future, and comparisons 
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with the past or future can be used—and traditionally have been 
used—to criticize policies of the present.261 
For Chinese films aiming for theatrical release on the mainland, 
censorship review begins prior to filming. A filmmaker must submit 
to SARFT an outline of the script for approval before filming can 
commence.262 At one film set visited by a writer for The Economist, 
the writer was told that the script had been revised approximately 
twenty times, and censors only agreed to approve the film after a 
sympathetic communist hero was written in.263 Films that do not 
undergo preproduction review are still frequently made in China, 
but their distribution options are limited to underground distribu-
tion, online distribution through one of China’s popular video 
streaming websites such as Youku.com or LeTV, or overseas dis-
tribution.264 
State control extends not only to content, it also extends to 
every aspect of film production, including governing who can in-
vest in and produce a film project. However, as suggested above in 
Part II.E, the need to privatize and commercialize film production 
has led to significant liberalization in these areas since the mid-
1990s. Prior to that time, only state funding could be used in film 
production. Subsequently, private entities, with the exception of 
foreign-owned entities, have been permitted (and encouraged) to 
invest in the film sector. In 2002, SARFT liberalized its production 
rules further to allow private (non-foreign-owned) companies to 
apply for one-off film production permits.265 Two years later it re-
vised its regulations again to permit private companies to apply di-
rectly for a permanent film production permit (under certain cir-
cumstances).266 
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Foreign investment and participation in mainland film produc-
tion is now permitted in the form of joint ventures and co-
productions with local partners so long as the foreign equity stake 
does not exceed forty-nine percent.267 Co-production is an increa-
singly popular model for Hollywood studios because the studio is 
directly involved in production, foreign studios can take advantage 
of cheaper labor and equipment costs by filming in China, and since 
co-productions are treated as domestic films they are not subject to 
the import cap and are eligible for a higher revenue share.268 As 
“domestic” Chinese films, however, co-productions are ostensibly 
subject to the same approval and content censorship rules as all 
other domestic productions.269 In addition, at least one-third of the 
“main cast” of any foreign-Sino co-production must be Chinese 
nationals,270 and the production should “abide by Chinese” laws 
and aim to promote China’s economic and cultural prosperity.271 
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B. The Market’s Effect on Censorship Rules and Practice 
1. The Market’s Role in Liberalizing Censorship Rules 
As evidenced above in Part II, market forces and foreign pres-
sure have had a demonstrable liberalizing effect on formal rules de-
signed to secure state control over film production. Less than two 
decades ago, only state work units were eligible to produce or in-
vest in domestic productions (with the exception of co-
productions). Because Chinese film productions had to be self-
sustaining, and therefore more attractive to consumers, because 
they had to compete with high production value Hollywood con-
tent, and because China was aiming to join the WTO, officials felt 
compelled to open the film sector up to private investment and al-
low the importation and distribution of foreign content.272 Just a 
few years later, in 2002, the same market and international pres-
sures (a function of global film commercialization) pushed SARFT 
to approve private companies for film production.273 By 2004, the 
rules were revised yet again to permit even foreign companies to 
directly invest in and jointly produce “domestic” Chinese films. 
More recently, SARFT decentralized the censorship review 
process for domestic films, placing review authority in the hands of 
regional rather than central government officials.274 The decentra-
lization effort was spurred by attempts to be more responsive to 
filmmakers’ needs and increase content review turnaround times. 
While it remains unclear how much this system will liberalize cen-
sorship practices, director Jia Zhangke, whose films have been the 
subject of high-profile bans, observed that “[i]f the power is not 
that centralized, it is also a signal that the censorship system will 
make some changes.”275 
In sum, in less than a decade, market forces pressed Chinese 
authorities to move from a system in which only domestic films 
could be distributed in theaters on a revenue-sharing basis and only 
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state-owned studios could produce and invest in domestic films, to 
one in which foreign blockbusters compete head-to-head with do-
mestic films and almost anyone, Chinese or foreign, can invest in 
and produce a film in China. 
2. The Market’s Effect on Censorship Practice: Approval of 
Films that Technically Violate Content Censorship Rules 
The regulations that demonstrably changed as a result of mar-
ket pressures have tended to be regulations governing investment 
and production. One reason Chinese officials may have been will-
ing to make such significant changes in such a short period of time 
is that they doubtless operate under the belief that content control, 
regardless of who produced or financed the film, is the key. Accor-
dingly, while SARFT liberalized its rules governing licensing and 
investment, it simultaneously tightened and expanded its rules go-
verning content. 
Although SARFT content regulations are getting increasingly 
strict, films are consistently released that violate the rules. See-
mingly countless films, domestic and foreign alike, repeatedly vi-
olate SARFT proscriptions against graphic violence, murder, crim-
inal activity, horrific imagery, and gore.276 Some examples from 
2014 alone include the Hollywood films Transformers: Age of Ex-
tinction (the 2014 China box office champion), X-Men: Days of Fu-
ture Past, Captain America: The Winter Soldier, The Hobbit: The De-
solation of Smaug, and Edge of Tomorrow. Many recent domestic 
films depict graphic violence, as the discussion that follows demon-
strates; and domestic horror productions are increasingly common 
including the 2014 hit The House that Never Dies (京城81号) and 
other recent popular films such as Midnight Whisper 
(半夜叫你别回头), Who in the Mirror (半夜不要照镜子), and 
Blood Stained Shoes (绣花鞋). 
While violence, gore, and horrific subject matter are now com-
monplace in Chinese theaters, these are not the only kinds of tech-
nically verboten subjects that frequently pass censorship. For ex-
ample, Breakup Buddies (心花路放) by mainland director Ning 
Hao is a comedy in which a recent divorcee and his best friend take 
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a road trip filled with misadventures.277 Many have complained 
that the film is rife with sexual innuendo, provocative scenes, and 
frank discussion of a one-night stand.278 The China Daily reported 
that many parents had unwittingly taken their children to see the 
“vulgar” film, and children could be heard in the theater asking 
their parents such questions as, “[w]hat is a condom?”279 Regard-
less, the film was a blockbuster, placing second overall in the Chi-
nese box office for 2014 and earning nearly $190 million.280 The 
film’s bawdy reputation doubtless had plenty to do with its success, 
but the film had the makings of a hit regardless, as Ning had di-
rected hit films in the past, and the lead actors in Breakup Buddies 
had recently paired up in one of the biggest hits in Chinese film his-
tory, the irreverent comedy Lost in Thailand.281 Domestic hits are 
key to the Chinese film industry’s vitality, sustainability, and com-
petitiveness with foreign imports—a factor that likely figured into 
the censorship review board’s decision when approving the film for 
distribution. 
One of Ning’s previous films, No Man’s Land (无人区) (2013), 
was banned for three years.282 The violent Chinese neo-“Western” 
about a series of murders and double-crossings that take place in 
rural Xinjiang province (a locale that happens to be a center of po-
litical unrest) portrays the murder of a policeman among other 
graphic depictions of violence, murder, and other crimes. The film, 
which has been favorably compared to the wryly nihilistic films of 
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Joel and Ethan Coen,283 was publicly criticized on the blog of a 
SARFT censorship official for being “trashy,” having “depraved” 
characters, allowing the guilty to remain at large in the end, depict-
ing police as “stupid and incompetent,” and “harming China’s 
national image.”284 Nevertheless, the film was ultimately released 
in China, some say after significant modifications,285 and was an 
instant hit, earning $42 million in the first month following its re-
lease.286 
2013 box office hit Drug War (毒战), a China-Hong Kong co-
production by celebrated Hong Kong director Johnnie To, was al-
legedly inspired by real-life Chinese mafia trials.287 The film per-
formed well at the Chinese box office and received critical acclaim 
abroad.288 It is packaged as a gangster thriller, but it takes on a 
number of controversial subjects including the illegal drug trade in 
China and prisoner execution.289 The story, which takes place in 
the Chinese city of Jinhai, involves a captured drug lord who seeks 
lighter sentencing in exchange for helping a shrewd police captain 
in a major sting operation. During the climactic gun battle between 
gang members and narcotics officers, virtually all of the officers, 
including the protagonist captain, are savagely killed in graphic fa-
shion.290 Drug War is the first Chinese film to graphically depict 
details of the drug trade, including how drugs are smuggled in the 
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human body and methamphetamine production.291 It was also the 
first to graphically depict a prisoner execution by lethal injection.292 
While To, like any director in China, did not have creative carte 
blanche, he still clearly had wide creative latitude and used it to po-
werful, thought-provoking effect. As New York Times critic Manho-
la Dargis observes:  
[W]hile Mr. To may not fill the movie with rousing 
speeches, either by inclination or out of political ne-
cessity, the brilliant, unsettling action scenes—ugly, 
savage, dehumanizing—speak volumes. (This is one 
of the rare times that the Hong Kong master has 
shot on the mainland, and if he faced any pressure 
from China’s censors to soften his material, it isn’t 
evident to an outsider.)293 
To be sure, Drug War betrays the fingerprints of ham-handed 
censors. The narcotics police are uncompromisingly valorous and 
self-sacrificing, and conspicuously devoid of moral reflection, fra-
gility, or doubt about their methods or the policies they enforce.294 
The cartoonishly exaggerated ill effects of drug use come across 
with all the realism and subtlety, one critic quips, of a public ser-
vice announcement by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America.295 
Even when the film ostensibly walks the party line, however, it 
manages to make a statement. The two-dimensional treatment of 
the narcotics officers, one critic suggests, only makes the criminals 
seem more human and sympathetic by comparison.296 Depictions 
of gangsters running amok in a crowded Chinese city might appear 
to justify the pervasive state surveillance the film depicts, but shots 
that linger on rows of security cameras at seemingly every intersec-
tion, and the repeated use of surveillance footage to depict key 
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events, are a constant reminder that everyone—not just crimi-
nals—live under the eye of the surveillance state. And while the 
film does not overtly question China’s draconian drug laws that 
make even trafficking a capital offense,297 the final scene, in which 
the antagonist’s execution is depicted in methodical, unflinching, 
close-up, and clinical detail, will inculcate in many viewers a feeling 
of discomfort or even compassion despite the prisoner’s monstrous 
deeds. 
The film violates SARFT content rules by concentrating on the 
darkest elements in Chinese society—depicting a criminal under-
world already deeply infiltrating Chinese cities and bringing acts of 
savagery and murder to the streets in broad daylight. Thus, even 
the director was surprised when the film reportedly passed censor-
ship review with minimal revisions.298 Despite its potentially prob-
lematic subject matter, the film, with its action-packed luster and 
critical acclaim, is doubtless the kind of film Chinese officials like 
to see in the market competing with Hollywood films and driving 
audiences to theaters. The desire to see such films achieve com-
mercial success limits censors’ ability to restrict filmmakers’ crea-
tive choices. 
Zhang Yimou’s 2014 film Coming Home (归来) explores the 
emotional and psychological trauma of a family rent asunder by the 
Cultural Revolution, and the painful reconciliation thereafter. The 
film is widely regarded as an allegory for the nation’s own difficult 
reconciliation with that painful period.299 The film’s release in 
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China and respectable domestic box office returns of $48 million 
contrast with Zhang’s 1994 film To Live (或者), which also ex-
plored a family decimated by the Cultural Revolution.300 To Live 
was banned in China, and Zhang was banned from filmmaking for 
two years as punishment for making the film.301 
It is worth pausing to note that China’s “underground” film-
making scene also tests the boundaries of acceptable content, al-
though the role of underground films in pressuring censors should 
not be overstated. Underground films differ from “aboveground” 
films in that they do not undergo or complete censorship review302 
and are ineligible for official distribution in China (although today 
many such films are made available on online streaming plat-
forms).303 Underground films do sometimes delve into forbidden 
subject matter, from controversial political topics to sensitive social 
themes such as homosexuality.304 Despite the “underground” la-
bel, however, most of these films are actually made with the state’s 
full knowledge and tacit consent.305 Underground films provide an 
outlet for new voices and perspectives and are an unofficial testing 
ground for controversial subject matter. Nevertheless, their effect 
on expanding the boundaries of officially tolerated speech is likely 
limited. Most underground films do not take on highly sensitive 
subject matter, and even those that do almost always stop short of 
directly criticizing the Party.306 Thus the differences between un-
derground films and approved films that test the boundaries are 
often not all that stark. Moreover, the line between underground 
and aboveground films and filmmakers is often blurry. For exam-
ple, some famous directors of approved films alternate between 
official and unofficial projects.307 Many unestablished underground 
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filmmakers appear to choose controversial subjects in order to at-
tract foreign attention, accolades, and investment, which they hope 
to parlay into subsequent opportunities to make approved mass 
market films in China.308 Lastly, because underground films are 
unofficial, their influence on rules governing officially tolerated 
speech is bound to be weaker than that of envelope-pushing ap-
proved films.309 
It seems that Chinese officials are powerless to stop the trend 
of audiences demanding increasingly diverse, direct, hard-hitting, 
and mature subject matter and filmmakers rushing in to satisfy that 
demand. SARFT officials complain privately (and publicly310) that 
films released in Chinese theaters today are “trashy.”311 China’s 
president Xi Jinping recently admonished creators not to allow 
their art to “lose its direction as it is absorbed into the market 
economy,” reminding them that the “basic requirement of the Par-
ty” is that “art must reflect well the people’s wishes; it must pers-
ist in the fundamental orientation of serving the people and serving 
Socialism.”312 Yet every one of the “trashy” films that regulators 
lament has undergone and passed their own review. Meanwhile, 
wholesome main melody films have long languished at the box of-
fice,313 as the 2013 film Young Lei Feng vividly demonstrated. Young 
Lei Feng, which told the apocryphal life story of a paragon of Revo-
lutionary virtue, was released to much official fanfare on “Learn 
From Lei Feng Day” but was reportedly pulled from theaters in 
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numerous cities on the first day after it “failed to sell a single tick-
et.”314 
Rather than calling for a return to yesteryear, many critics of 
the increasingly diverse, sexual, violent, and thematically-mature 
films produced in China are calling for a film rating system.315 Chi-
na does not have a rating system, as many countries do, to indicate 
the content’s age appropriateness.316 The lack of a rating system 
derives from the Party’s position that unhealthy content is prohi-
bited from distribution; therefore, any film appropriate for adults is 
equally appropriate for children. The divergence between theory 
and reality on this point has grown for the better part of three dec-
ades, and it is not coincidental that that span has witnessed the 
growth of film commercialization. The premise that all approved 
content is “healthy” for the masses is a principal justification for 
the sweeping content censorship rules. Adopting a rating system 
would be tantamount to admitting that certain segments of society 
can tolerate “unhealthy” graphic or disturbing content—a funda-
mental paradox given film and literature’s role as a morally and po-
litically edifying medium. Unsurprisingly, therefore, authorities 
steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that formal content regulations 
are profoundly out of step with the realities of content produced 
and distributed now in China.317 Consumers and even distributors 
may be poised to force their hand, however. In 2013, the China 
Consumers Association publicly called for a ratings system, and a 
survey of more than six-thousand moviegoers found that ninety 
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percent support a ratings system.318 The public outcry over the in-
appropriateness of Breakup Buddies for children, and the lack of any 
way for parents to determine the level of appropriateness before-
hand, renewed the media debate over a film ratings system in 
2014.319 One theater owner made international news by taking mat-
ters into his own hands and instituting and enforcing his own rat-
ings system.320 If (and perhaps when) the Party admits the Empe-
ror has no clothes and adopts a ratings system, it may be the most 
overt demonstration yet of the market’s formidable counterweight 
to the power of state censors and ideologues. 
There are, of course, many films that do not pass censorship 
review, including ostensibly “aboveground” films produced as part 
of the official process. One notable example of the latter is Li Yu’s 
Lost in Beijing, which was initially approved for distribution in 2008 
and then subsequently banned and pulled from theaters after gross-
ing over $2 million.321 The film, a drama/domestic comedy, deals 
explicitly with topics such as rape, infidelity, gambling, and marital 
strife.322 In a memo circulated to SARFT officials, the film was 
banned because it was distributed in China and overseas with 
“pornographic content” that had not passed censorship review.323 
Often, there are no clear answers for why a given film is ap-
proved while a similar film is not. What does seem clear, however, 
is that market demands and industry concerns now factor signifi-
cantly into the equation. As political scientist Stanley Rosen and 
cinema studies professor Ying Zhu observe, 
In the absence of the familiar state subsidies of the 
Maoist era, media and cultural units in postsocialist 
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China are judged by their commercial success in a 
crowded marketplace. State authorities and regula-
tors fully understand this, even when the primary 
(political) values of the authorities are incongruent 
with the (commercial) values of the units they su-
pervise. This has led to a system marked by negotia-
tion, sometimes tacit and sometimes public, where 
cultural units may include their audiences as a 
means of pressuring the authorities to exercise re-
straint in their control and regulation.324 
Thus, the film censorship process involves a three-way dialog 
between the censors, the audience, and filmmakers. Censors wield 
great power over filmmakers but relatively little direct power over 
the audience, which has the option of simply avoiding the cinema if 
the offerings are not compelling, as happened in the 1990s.325 
Filmmakers need to produce attractive and compelling content. 
Even in these box office boom times, filmgoers are dissatisfied with 
the quality of Chinese films, noting as major reasons domestic 
films’ similarity, thematic repetition, and lack of creativity—all 
problems that largely stem from or are exacerbated by censor-
ship.326 If consumer dissatisfaction manifests itself in sagging box 
office returns for domestic films, the pressure on SARFT to loosen 
the censorship reigns further will mount. 
Why would the Party feel the need to yield to market pressures 
and temper their information control practices, at least to some ex-
tent, to ensure the continued health and growth of the domestic 
film industry? There are at least five reasons. First, as discussed 
above in Part II, state-supported filmmaking is unsustainable and 
goes against the grain of economic reform and privatization that 
has revolutionized much of China’s economy. Second, film is an 
important form of entertainment and social release in China, espe-
cially for young people,327 and officials at the highest level recog-
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nize film’s social value as a form of entertainment.328 Ensuring the 
health and growth of a film industry that puts out quality product 
to satisfy demand fits within the Party’s strategy of non-democratic 
appeasement that some have called “responsive authoritarian-
ism.”329 Third, officials also recognize the film industry’s potential 
as a high-growth, low carbon-impact “green business,” and are in-
centivized to foster its growth.330 Fourth, there is an ever-
increasingly blurred line between state and private interests in Chi-
na. China Film Group (“CFG”), for example, is a massive state-
owned enterprise, the largest player in the Chinese film industry, 
and the paramount member of the state-run film import duopoly.331 
As an investor in all aspects of the industry from film technologies 
to production, importation, and distribution, CFG is extremely in-
vested in the success of China’s film industry, as are many other 
state-owned or invested companies.332 Fifth, officials have repeat-
edly voiced a desire to improve China’s global “soft power,” that 
is, its ability to attain desired outcomes through attraction and per-
suasion rather than force.333 The United States’ attractive power 
through its culture industries, Hollywood in particular, is the para-
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digmatic example, and one that China has studied well.334 In 
theory, the more advanced, globally competitive, and attractive 
Chinese films are, the more global audiences will be attracted to 
Chinese culture. In government documents, soft power is expressly 
cited as an important reason to foster a flourishing film industry.335 
Until now, foreign consumers have shown little interest in Chinese 
films, and many theorize that the creative shackling that results 
from censorship is a major reason why.336 Giving Chinese films the 
creative space needed to be globally competitive is another pres-
sure point to which Chinese censors are no doubt increasingly sen-
sitive. Lastly, some observers argue the government’s obvious wil-
lingness to turn a blind eye to content regulation violations reflects 
the influence of cultural liberals within the Party.337 The Party lib-
erals believe that a permissive approach will improve China’s glob-
al image and provide a steam valve for a new generation of creative 
talent.338 In exchange for having more creative freedom, filmmak-
ers will accept the unwritten ground rules: no direct criticism of the 
party and no overt calls for mobilization.339 
3. SARFT Censorship Practice as an Adaptive Informal 
Institution that Could Lead to Liberalization of Formal 
Content Regulations 
The previous subsection demonstrates that censors routinely 
act in ways that permit widespread technical violations of content 
regulations. Still, the rules are not invoked or ignored consistently, 
and the ad hoc and opaque nature of the practice is eminently fru-
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strating to film producers trying to differentiate their product by 
pushing the limits of acceptable content. That said, the ad hoc na-
ture of censorship practice might in fact engender formal liberaliza-
tion down the road. 
Attempts to create a more open, transparent media while si-
multaneously attempting to maintain effective ideological control 
over that media creates an apparently irreconcilable dilemma for 
Chinese policy makers. The Party may, as Rogier Creemers puts it, 
simply be “trapped.”340 In that case, there are two potential out-
comes. First, censors could take a hardline turn, strengthening the 
formal content rules and enforcing them emphatically. This out-
come seems unlikely, as it would certainly lead to a significant 
downturn in the Chinese film industry that would, for reasons dis-
cussed above, be unacceptable to Chinese authorities. Second, and 
more plausibly, censorship officials could take a more organic, 
permissive, and experimental approach to censorship practice, 
while leaving the more restrictive formal laws intact as a baseline 
standard until circumstances warrant a change in formal laws. In 
fact, this circumstance echoes previous high-stakes clashes be-
tween ideology and practical, market-driven considerations in 
which the latter ultimately gained an upper hand over ideology and 
Party control—namely, China’s large scale economic reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Political science professor Kellee Tsai observes that most insti-
tutions do not exist in isolation.341 Rather, they often exist in mu-
tually dependent clusters.342 Changes in formal institutions often 
result not from top-down decisions but from coping strategies that 
arise on the ground in reaction to limitations and restrictions in 
formal institutions that develop into widely practiced regularized 
patterns of interactions that violate the formal institutions.343 
These regularized, violative practices become informal institutions 
in their own right.344 These widespread informal practices, which 
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Tsai calls “adaptive informal institutions,” contribute to the “in-
stitutional conversion of a formal regulation.”345 
To demonstrate this principle, Tsai argues that China’s sweep-
ing economic reforms did not originate with top-down economic 
policymaking.346 In fact, “China’s formal institutions have pre-
sented local state and economic actors with more of a constraining 
rather than a permissive environment for private capital accumula-
tion.”347 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when large numbers of 
private entrepreneurs sprang up in China, private businesses were 
illegal and there was much disagreement and uncertainty among 
Party leaders about the direction of economic reform and the desi-
rability of private enterprise.348 Nevertheless, many individuals, 
faced with a dearth of income-generating opportunities after the 
dismantling of the “iron rice bowl” of socialism, began engaging in 
entrepreneurial activity.349 Local cadres, who oversaw locales that 
faced their own economic difficulties, had little incentive to enforce 
the formal rules and every incentive to bend them to accommodate 
these money-generating entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, many lo-
cal cadres joined the emerging entrepreneurial class. After some 
time, the entrepreneurialism operating in a legal gray zone was suf-
ficiently widespread and effective to convince central government 
officials that a shift toward a market-oriented economy would 
work. It was only then that changes to the formal laws occurred. In 
Tsai’s example, the formal institutions trailed and were influenced 
by informal adaptations that responded to practical realities on the 
ground.350 
The more actual practice diverges from the formal rules, and 
the more entrenched the practice becomes, the more likely it is that 
the formal rules will eventually change to reflect the practice. Such 
change can already be observed in China’s copyright industries. 
Professor Hongsong Song demonstrates that as China’s book in-
dustry transitioned from state-subsidized production to market-
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based production and remuneration in the 1990s, state firms lagged 
far behind the practices of the illicit private publishers, who paid 
their authors copyright royalties instead of the basic remuneration 
rates still practiced by state publishers.351 Successful authors were 
highly incentivized to work with private publishers (which were 
fronted by state publishing operations)352 as the authors could make 
far more money publishing with private publishers than with state 
publishers.353 The resulting formal reforms, spurred by economi-
cally driven informal coping strategies, follow the same evolutio-
nary path from coping strategy to adaptive informal institution to 
formal reform that Professor Tsai describes: 
In the process of commercialization, market forces 
gradually changed the behavior of the participants in 
the publishing sector and established a new set of 
conventions largely based on the profit motive. The 
official acceptance of copyright royalties shows how 
the new behavioral principles achieved a dominant 
role in practice and forced the state to change for-
mal rules to match reality . . . . 
The emergence and growth of copyright royal-
ties in the 1990s was a significant event for both the 
relaxation of press control and the development of 
copyright. The increasing importance of market-
driven copyright royalties meant not only that copy-
right holders were able to enjoy market profits, but 
also that there was a significant decline in state pa-
tronage and a corresponding rise in authors’ inde-
pendence.354 
This model suggests it is possible for informal practices, such 
as allowance of films that formally violate censorship rules, to in-
duce bottom-up changes to the formal regulations. While there has 
not yet been formal liberalization of content regulations, in the 
long-term, the prospects for such a change are promising given the 
gradually (albeit spasmodically) increasing divide between formal 
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censorship rules and practice. The decentralization of SARFT cen-
sorship review, noted above, could also help spur this change, just 
as in the economic reform context, where local responses to prac-
tical realities of entrepreneurs were conducive to driving bottom-
up policy changes that would have been impossible in a system of 
highly centralized control.355 
4. The Social and Expressive Value of Film 
Commercialization Undergirded by Copyright 
Among the examples of films discussed above that violate 
SARFT content rules, none takes on the most politically sensitive 
subject matter in today’s China. None overtly challenges Party rule 
or calls for a democratic system of government, for example, which 
would doubtless trigger an instant ban. Nevertheless, the films 
above offer fresh viewpoints on topics of importance to contempo-
rary Chinese society in a package with broad appeal.356 Breakup 
Buddies, for example, while on the surface a bawdy comedy, ex-
plores relationships, divorce, and sexuality in an aging Chinese so-
ciety, and, in the director’s vision, is an allegory for Chinese socie-
ty itself as it reaches a crossroads in its political and economic ma-
turation. As Ning recently told the Hollywood Reporter, 
For the last 30 years, China has experienced fast de-
velopment. After the fast development, it is slowing 
down. It is like a transition from a young person to 
middle age. He faces some problems and he must 
think of what was not good before and where to go 
in the future. My feeling is that China is experienc-
ing middle age and adjusting itself after fast devel-
opment. 
Because of the fast development, people’s val-
ues are a bit thin and the only one value is success. It 
will create some problems for sure if you measure 
everything by this yardstick, including love. So a 
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one-night stand appears to be a way of releasing 
pressure and dissatisfaction with love. It becomes a 
normal phenomenon. I want to use this angle to tell 
a modern story.357 
Ning’s No Man’s Land, beneath its violence, action, and dark 
humor, comments on “disintegrating morality and unchecked, 
rampant selfishness” and “shines a glaring light on how little life is 
valued in modern mercenary China,” even though all along “Ning 
is having a gleefully nasty time with it.”358 Even the slapstick romp 
and megahit Lost in Thailand derives much humor and much of its 
vast success from lampooning materialism and exposing the anxie-
ties of China’s urban middle class.359 
One should not discount the social importance of such messag-
es. As Professor Paul Pickowicz argues, numerous creators who 
chose to work in the “velvet prison” of the official but moderately 
permissive aboveground film sector in China have, through their 
critical examinations of Chinese society and politics, “chipped 
away at the foundation of state socialism” and “eroded public con-
fidence in the system.”360 Chinese literature has a great tradition of 
critical or oppositional messages embedded in entertaining and 
seemingly apolitical works. Moreover, it is easy—especially for 
Western critics—to primarily evaluate phenomena within China 
through the limited and polarized lens of democratization. Profes-
sor Bingchun Meng argues that researchers of China’s Internet ap-
pear to have an “ongoing fixation, in both the mainstream media 
and the academic circle, on whether the Internet could democrat-
ize China.”361 She notes a number of problems with that limited 
approach, including that it imposes a Western-centric view of 
progress, is likely to result in missing important nuances in chang-
ing power relationships in society, and may cause one to overlook 
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the experience and effect on average consumers.362 This is not to 
discount the importance of democratic values for China and 
beyond; rather, it is to emphasize that films—even officially ap-
proved commercial films—can and do speak to many other top-
ics—even sensitive topics—of importance to ordinary Chinese cit-
izens. Most importantly, the general long-term trend, partly if not 
largely coerced by market trends, appears to be toward permitting 
more, not fewer, such topics to be addressed in film. Thus, even 
partial media liberalization has important social benefits, powerful 
critical potential, and the potential to engender further media libe-
ralization. 
There is an inherent danger in partial media liberalization, 
however. As Daniela Stockmann has demonstrated, partial liberali-
zation of the news and print media in China, driven by commercial 
imperatives similar to those encountered by the film industry, has 
probably led to more effective state information control over sensi-
tive topics, despite the explosion of commercial magazines and 
news publications eager to feed a vast market hungry for new news 
and perspectives.363 What explains this paradox? The answer, ac-
cording to Professor Stockmann, lies in consumer perceptions of 
free speech based on the perceived nature of the speaker.364 For 
news concerning politically sensitive topics, consumers are more 
likely to be skeptical of traditional “political organ papers” such as 
the People’s Daily or China Daily, which they believe to parrot the 
Party line.365 On the other hand, consumers are more likely to trust 
messages in commercialized papers and magazines, which “brand 
themselves as trustworthy representatives of ordinary citizens, 
leading to greater credibility in the eyes of audiences.”366 Commer-
cialized media is responsive to market demand and thus “feels 
free” to consumers, especially when reporting on less sensitive 
topics. But the more sensitive the topic, the more censorship me-
chanisms that control all licit news media, even commercialized 
media, kick in to ensure that the tone and position taken in com-
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mercial media does not diverge too sharply from the Party line. 
Thus what feels like free reporting to consumers is often the Party 
line. In this way, partial press freedom actually increases the persu-
asiveness of the Party’s messaging.367 
This is an obvious danger in the film space, as well. Main melo-
dy films are currently viewed as ham-handed propaganda that is of 
little interest to most consumers. The government will doubtless 
improve its ability to weave its message into entertaining, attractive 
films both through the production of better features and through 
required revisions that both add and delete content. 
While the market enables this form of more persuasive messag-
ing, the market also provides a strong counterbalance. The au-
dience’s relationship to film, which is primarily a form of enter-
tainment, differs from its relationship to news media. If the au-
dience feels that domestic film content becomes too narrow or pre-
dictable, which is already a common complaint,368 history indicates 
that attendance will suffer—an outcome that, for reasons described 
above,369 is unacceptable to authorities. Market pressures are the 
best way to ensure new voices and viewpoints emerge that stimu-
late audiences. The alternative model—a dual production system 
with official state-supported main melody films on one extreme and 
unapproved underground films on the other, holds little promise 
for producing a vibrant, diverse film culture in China. After all, un-
derground films require funding, as well. But, as Geremie Barmé 
observes, since they cannot be lawfully distributed and monetized 
in China, underground films have a history of being crafted to 
please a different master—Western audiences and critics.370 For 
this reason, director Chen Daming believes even underground 
films “are not a true reflection of China.”371 Chen believes that 
filmmakers should participate in aboveground filmmaking, despite 
the burdens of censorship.372 What the industry needs, he argues, is 
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high quality domestic cinema,373 not the shunting of China’s most 
talented directors and writers into lower-production-value, margi-
nalized underground cinema, or into other industries altogether. 
Even in the case of news media in China, Stockmann observes a 
phenomenon akin to that which this Article argues is occurring in 
the film space: “marketized media bring about political change,” 
even if not democratic reform.374 “The introduction of market me-
chanisms leads media to undergo cycles of liberalization and re-
trenchment,” Stockmann observes, “whereby the state walks a 
fine line between tolerating space to respond to market demands 
and controlling media content.”375 Noting that censorship authori-
ties are sensitive—to a point—to market demands, Stockmann 
concludes that “[i]n the long term, these dynamics appear to lead 
to greater openness of space in news reporting and cautious ad-
justments of central policy positions to popular demands.”376 
While to date, according to Stockmann, this has failed to yield 
greater pluralism of political viewpoints on sensitive subjects in 
news media,377 it provides evidence that the market-censor-
producer relationship is dynamic and each group exercises a meas-
ure of power to counterbalance and influence the others. Further-
more, this exercise of power can, through inducing widespread in-
formal coping mechanisms, lead to liberalization of formal rules to 
the benefit of all consumers of information in China. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s main claim is simple and relatively narrow: film 
industry commercialization in China, enabled and undergirded by 
copyright law, is not a drag on free speech. To the contrary, it en-
genders liberalization of the government’s informal censorship 
practices and even its formal censorship rules. This has led to 
greater diversity of film subject matter available for mass consump-
tion than any other model. 
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I do not argue that copyright and commercialization is a pana-
cea that will fully defang or obliterate censorship policies or trigger 
higher-level political reforms. Censorship remains the bane of Chi-
na’s film industry and, as China’s film industry grows in global im-
portance, the global film industry. Free speech in China’s film in-
dustry has a tremendously long way to go. Censorship in China is 
deeply rooted in traditional views of literature as morally edifying, 
and today film censorship is, in the Party’s view, closely tied to 
state legitimacy and stability. Nevertheless, contemporary censor-
ship practice in China’s film industry results from a dialog between 
the market, the censors, and filmmakers. Market demands and 
filmmakers’ need and desire to satisfy those demands (in addition 
to their own creative impulses) have provided a counterbalance to 
state censorship that can, does, and likely will continue to erode 
censorship practices as well as formal content-oriented rules. The 
alternative model—state patronage that produces “main melody” 
propaganda films while private filmmakers produce underground 
films that are unable to reach a mass Chinese audience and there-
fore might not even be produced with a Chinese audience in 
mind—would have far more negative consequences for expressive 
diversity in Chinese cinema. 
